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The United States was approaching the brink of open warfare with North Vietnam by the 
time the tension-filled Gulf of Tonkin events of August 1964 occurred. These events soon 
became crucially important because they provided an immediate justification for the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution and for a greater American military role. The Gulf conflict also 
solidified a pattern of presidential control over the Vietnam War without any significant 
Congressional interference. Lyndon Johnson's political goals took precedent over nearly 
all military considerations, and the American escalation of the war began in earnest.  
Among the three books under review, Edwin E. Moise's Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation 
of the Gulf War offers the richest, most complete coverage of the war's initial 
intensification. Moise analyzes the growing conflict with an admirable mastery of naval 
strategies, technologies and manpower. His research is enhanced by a meticulous study of 
declassified documents and personal interviews conducted with American and 
Vietnamese military and political participants. Moise concludes that the Johnson 
administration and the US Navy brought the nation to the brink of war through 
incompetence rather than by design or conspiracy.  
As Moise reports, the American naval presence in the Gulf of Tonkin had been growing 
apace immediately before the events of August 1964. Instead of the usual naval patrols, 
however, the US had opted for the OPLAN 34A covert operations. Since this plan 
combined American control over training, strategy and raids and South Vietnamese 
personnel, the North Vietnamese quickly learned that these coastal raids represented US 
foreign policy. The OPLAN 34A attacks had several disastrous and unintended 
consequences. First, the raiding parties were consistently captured and in turn gave 
valuable intelligence to their captors. Secondly, North Vietnam was alerted to the 
American designs on the Gulf, and accordingly became more vigilant with its radar, 
patrols and well-developed espionage system. Finally, when the covert raids later 
coincided with DeSoto patrol cruises by the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy, North 
Vietnam correctly anticipated a full-scale war. It then began to send combat troops down 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail for the first time; the consequent National Liberation Front 
infiltration into South Vietnam further weakened that government's authority. When the 
US launched the Rolling Thunder bombings in February 1965, it became apparent that 
the Tonkin Gulf incidents of the previous August had marked a point of no return toward 
a full-scale war.  
Moise presents an impressive array of evidence in his argument that the August 1964 
Tonkin Gulf incidents were considered real attacks and not fabrications by US officials. 
The question thus becomes, what circumstances led to such an erroneous judgment? For 
starters, nearly all sailors aboard the Maddox and the Turner Joy lacked actual combat 
experience, and so the first "engagement" with the enemy seemed real enough. In 
addition, these DeSoto patrol crews were unfamiliar with the Gulf of Tonkin and 
consequently misinterpreted numerous unexplained signs as enemy vessels and fire. The 
extremely dark and stormy Gulf on the night of 4 August produced mysterious radar blips 
or "ghosts" which were quite numerous and ephemeral. Inexperienced sonarmen could 
not distinguish between apparent enemy boats and sea squalls, sea gulls and sea shadows 
created by air cover overhead. Inexplicable "noise spooks" were also reported, which 
probably stemmed from the horrendous weather and even the ships' own engines. These 
bogus sights and sounds were communicated to the nearby aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, 
and frequently found their way into reports to Washington. In the midst of the 1964 
presidential election, the Johnson administration was encouraging such exaggerated 
military information so that it could take a tougher stance against Vietnamese 
communism. 
Besides covering the Gulf of Tonkin military situation quite well, Moise also displays an 
acute knowledge of the American political context. Instead of engaging in trite Johnson 
administration bashing, Moise captures the complexity of the escalation in Vietnam. For 
example, he notes how confusing it was in the White House to receive a blizzard of hasty 
and often contradictory messages from the Gulf. According to Moise, "McNamara did 
not have a clear picture of what was happening on the far side of the Pacific. The 
president probably knew considerably less." (p. 216) Thus, Johnson and Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara assumed that North Vietnam was deliberately provocative 
toward the US in the absence of clear cut information to the contrary. In retaliation for 
the supposed North Vietnam attacks on 4 August, the next day Johnson announced 
bombing raids on national television. However, the announcement ruined the element of 
surprise as the pilots were told, while in preparation, that "Johnson had gone on television 
a half an hour before and announced the raids." (p. 219) Because such mistakes were not 
well-known, Johnson's actions in the Gulf received overwhelming public support. From 
such support he achieved his goal of getting Congressional backing when the notorious 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed on 7 August.  
While Moise's monograph makes a major contribution to our understanding of the 
Vietnam War's origins, the same cannot be said of Ezra Y. Siff's Why the Senate Slept: 
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War. Whereas 
Moise empathizes with the political figures involved in this Resolution, Siff virtually 
divides the politicians into good and bad guys. In Siff's simplified typology, McNamara 
and presidential advisor McGeorge Bundy seem to rank as the chief bad guys who 
somehow conspire to shift US policy toward a state of war with Vietnam. When 
McNamara gave contradictory testimony to the Senate regarding the Gulf events, Siff 
chalks this outcome up to a dangerous, manipulative manner on McNamara's part. 
Although such an argument has been made many times, Siff resorts to sarcasm and ad 
hominem attacks and thus weakens his case. For example, Siff writes that McNamara is 
"supposedly intelligent," (p. 65) which is a totally inaccurate caricature of his intellect, 
regardless of McNamara's other faults. In addition, Siff states that McNamara, Bundy and 
several others manipulated Johnson on Vietnam and even "forced his hand." (p. 8) This 
interpretation brings up another fault of Siff's study: he continuously depicts Johnson as a 
weak, vacillating leader who was often bullied on foreign policy, and this is a skewed 
picture of LBJ's governing style.  
While Siff places Johnson in a bad guy category for going along with the Vietnam War, 
he curiously paints President John Kennedy as a good guy who would have gotten the US 
out of the war. Of course, this is a popular myth held by many others besides Siff, but it is 
a myth that should die a permanent death. Kennedy had increased US troop strength in 
Vietnam from 750 in early 1961 to 16,000 by late 1963, and there were no realistic signs 
of any potential withdrawal. In reality, Kennedy had become more militantly anti-
communist after the Berlin Wall construction, the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, and a tough stance against North Vietnam was popular with the public and the 
military. Strangely, Siff keeps referring to a JFK Senate speech from 1954 to support his 
thesis concerning the late president, but that speech had almost no effect on the Kennedy 
presidency years later. Besides Kennedy, Siff also constructs a few senators as anti-war 
heroes. He reserves the most praise for Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR), a committed anti-
war figure from the outset, and Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), who later became anti-
war. When these senators continually lose political fights with the Johnson administration 
over Vietnam, they are canonized as prophets without honor in Washington. This 
hagiography is more understandable if we consider that Siff served Nelson as a 
legislative assistant from 1965 to 1968.  
In contrast to Moise and Siff's narrow chronological time frames, Joseph G. Morgan 
offers a broader overview of the Vietnam War in his work The Vietnam Lobby: The 
American Friends of Vietnam, 1955-1975. This study examines the role that the 
American Friends of Vietnam (AFV) played in shaping the US's Vietnam policy before 
and during the war. An appealing aspect of Morgan's approach is that he constantly shifts 
between the AFV's activities and the major events of the conflict. While Morgan 
sometimes lacks depth of analysis concerning volatile US-Vietnam relations, he makes 
up for it with solid summaries on topics ranging from the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
in 1954 to the US troop withdrawal in 1973. Mainly, Morgan sets out to debunk the 
concept that the AFV was a particularly powerful special interest group that was largely 
responsible for the US commitment to Vietnam. Since the 1960s many liberals have 
decried the AFV's apparently pernicious influence over US foreign policy. However, 
Morgan concludes that "the AFV played a marginal role, at best, in bringing about this 
intervention." (p. 153) When the American government increased its Vietnam 
commitment under Kennedy and Johnson, it saw the AFV as a small but convenient 
cheerleader for its policies. However, when the anti-communist AFV questioned either 
the South Vietnam regime or US military strategy, political leaders simply ignored the 
group as a marginal lobbying faction.  
In conclusion, Moise's Tonkin Gulf provides the most thorough account of the Vietnam 
War's initial phase. Overall, Moise provides an excellent survey of the US Navy in the 
Gulf, all thoroughly supported by massive archival research and personal interviews. By 
contrast, Siff's Why the Senate Slept grinds too many political axes and overly simplifies 
too many complex issues. Finally, Morgan's The Vietnam Lobby is well-documented and 
well-written, its only serious drawback being that it covers a fairly obscure organization. 
Ultimately, Moise's Tonkin Gulf should achieve the most enduring impact on Vietnam 
War scholarship.  
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